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The Bolivian Revolution of 1952
On April g, lg52 the forces of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
(MNR) which was primarily composed of the lower classes rose up in revolt in Bolivia
against the oligarchic state and the national military that traditionally supported it. After
just three days of intense fighting they had captured most of the urban centers of power,
but the revolution was far from over. Over the course of the next twelve years until the
government was once again overthrown in a military coup, the MNR implemented a
striking series of social and economic reforms, the most important of which were land
reform, the enfranchisement of all women and the urban and rural lower classes
(including Indian peasants), and the nationalization of the tin mines. In many ways
Bolivia proved itself to more progressive than many of its South American neighbors, but
it also showed a profound sense of pragmatism in balancing domestic demands with the
international realities of the post-war environment-all of this was done despite the lack
of unified leadership or a consistent political agenda in the MNR. This paper will
examine the factors that contributed to the formation of such an ideologically vague (but
vastly popular) revolutionary movement and argue that the failure of the MNR to
articulate a clear political program led both to the flexibility of the movement in the years
immediately following the revolution and to its ultimate demise. This investigation will
be a synthesis of secondary sources that focus on specific aspects of the Bolivian
revolution, namely the social and economic effects of the event.
,
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Historically the Indian peasants of Bolivia have been the subjects of a one empire
after another beginning with the Tiwanaku, then the Inca, and finally the Spanish.
Freedom from the Spanish did not, however, improve their condition. As a matter of fact
the result was quite the opposite. According to James Kohl, when viewed together the
periods of Spanish and Republican history represent "a process if increasing
subordination."l In addition to the process of subordination Fernando Garcfa Argaflar6s
argues that "the coexistence of small subsistence plots with the hacienda (or large landed
estate), in the context of high demographic density and limited supply of land, made for
increasing conflict between colonos (or share croppers) and landowners."2 This conflict
or ,,vertical cleavage" of Bolivian society represented only one of the problems that
preventing the development of the Indians as a society. Another important division was
the "horizontal cleavage" that divided Indians along linguistic and regional lines.3
As Argaflar6s indicates, "the Bolivian social formation was dominated by tin-
mining interests and a landed oligarchy with roots in the colonial past."4 He further states
that "in the prevailing international division of labor preceding World War II, Bolivia had
become a mineral-exporting country which, in turn, was the recipient of foodstuffs,
manufactures, and technology from dominant countries."S The "Tin Barons" that
controlled Bolivia's mining interests formed a superestado that was not just above the
authority of the state, but actually possessed the majority of the political and economic
power. Thus, even though Bolivia was nominally a republic, the real power was
I James V. Kohl, "The Cliza and Urcurena War: Syndical Violence and National Revolution in
Bolivia," The Hispanic American Historical Review 62,no' 4 (1982):609'
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Bolivian Revolution," Journal of Inter'American Stud.ies 6, no' 3 (1964):367 '




controlled by a small number of unelected individuals by virtue of their economic
influence in a state completely dependant upon its mineral exports. Before the revolution,
social mobility was severely limited. Opportunities for upward mobility were limited to
the military, the acquisition of wealth, a formal education or perhaps politics.6
The Chaco War is widely considered by scholars to be the primary event that
aroused the political consciousness on Bolivian peasants. Some 100,000 Indian peasants
left their traditional villages in order to participate directly in the War. This experience, as
Bergsten indicates, led the Bolivian peasant to "view more liberally his prospective role
in the national society."T Kohl, however, believes that the 1945 Indian Congress was
,.perhaps of equal consequence."s This event marked the height of Indian efforts to
pursue peaceful reform with in the confines of the pre-revolutionary republic. Such
peasant leaders as Francisco Chipana Ramos, Luis Ramos Quevado, Santos Marca Tola,
Dionisio Miranda and Antonio Mamani Alyarez participated in this historical event. Kohl
argues that to neglect the recognition of this event is to fail to appreciate the role of the
peasantry as a revolutionary force.e
In addition to politicizing the peasant masses, the Chaco War is also responsible
for discrediting the traditional leadership. As Argaflar6s states, "the defeat by Paraguay
showed at once the profound incapacity of the oligarchic state to protect the integrity of
national territory, giving rise to a nationalist movement that spilled over ethnicocultural,
regional, and-to some degree-class boundaries."l0 The power of the elites had always
6 Fred Bergsten, "social Mobility and Economic Development," 368'
'Ibid., 368.
s James V. Kohl, '?easant and Revolution in Bolivia, April9, 1952-August2, L953," The
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been tied to their control over the military. The loss of Bolivia to Paraguay, which had
been considered to be militarily inferior, severely eroded the legitimacy on the
government.
The revolution of 1952 was not the first attempt to seize power from the
oligarchic governmen t. ln 1949, an insurgency attempted to capture the provincial
capitols. This event, known as the Bolivian Civil War, served as a valuable instructive
tool for the organizers of the l912rebellion. Kohl points out that the insurrection in 1949
failed to seek out the support of the peasant masses and the enlisted personnel of the
armed forces. These faults were remedied in 1952, and largely accounted for the success
of the initial phases of the revolution." During this revolution the MNR became a banner
under which the diverse opposition groups to the Bolivian state organized, but as
Argafrar6s argues, this does not necessarily indicate that it possessed a clear agenda or
that is was the expression of a "single state will."l2 Regardless of its political ambiguities,
the MNR was quite popular at the polls even considering the limited suffrage that existed
in Bolivia prior to 1952. The MNR participated in the supposedly free elections of 1951,
but despite wining a plurality it was denied the presidency.
Kohl points out that Richard Patch, who he calls "the most influential student of
Bolivian rural politics during the national revolution," argues that the revolution
originated from the peasant sindicatos of the Cochabama Valley under the leadership of
Jos6 Rojas.l3 Whether or not this is where the revolution began or not, it is clear that the
campesinos were acting on their own wills and not directly under the control of the
l' Kohl,'?easant and Revolutiot"' 242.
12 Argaflards, "Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 47.
" RiC'hard Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams, et al.,
Social Change in l-atin America Today (New York, 1961) in Kohl, '?easant and Revolution," 242.
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revolutionary government. They seized the large estates of their landlords completely of
their own accord, and this largely accounts for the rationale behind the Declaration of
Land Reform that followed. The MNR was not so much making a policy as recognizing
the current state of affairs in rural Bolivia. Yet despite their sizable contributions to the
revolution, namely the popular legitimacy that they gave to the program of the petty
bourgeoisie and the urban proletariat, it must be acknowledged that the peasants were not
capable of canying out the revolution on their own because of their inability to state will
of their own. Only in conjunction with the urban lower classes was this possible'l4
The insurgency that actually overthrew the Bolivian oligarchy began on April 9,
1952. After three days of intense fighting it was clear that the revolutionaries had
succeeded. "The postwar split between the defenders of the status quo and advocates of a
new order was reproduced within the armed forces."l5 Military was purged of the
supporters of the traditional elite. In the process of the revolution it was dishonored,
proving itself unable even to win a war against its own citizens. For a brief time the
national army was even disbanded and the arms seized from it were distributed to the
peasant militias.l6 Peasants did not directly participate in the initial insurgency to
overthrow the elites and their military backers, but the leaders of the insurgency were
prepared to mobilize the peasant masses if the revolution did not proceed smoothly. In
general, peasant mobilization came in the months and years following the revolution. "It
is noteworthy that both landlord and peasant resorted to the utilization of pressure
groups-landlord federations and peasant syndicates-to further their respective class
la Argaflar6s, "Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 48
15 Ibid.,45.
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o interests."l7 Nevertheless the peasants ultimately achieved dominion over the
countryside, all but destroying the landlord class in the process. The hesitancy of the
leaders of the revolution to mobilize the peasant masses gives further evidence that,
although the Bolivian Revolution is hailed as a classless revolution, the white minority
that controlled the revolution (or at least the revolutionary government) was still
concerned about the usurpation of their power by the peasants.l8 This fits with Argaflards
concept that this type of revolution, "one occurring in the context of peripheral societies,
is mainly carried out by petty-bourgeois and proletarian forces because of their common
antagonism toward the old semifeudal order."le
Soon after the MNR had taken control of the government, all women, Indians, and
illiterates were extended suffrage. Previously only some 200,000 propertied males had
the vote.2o The evolution of a rural government structure based on the peasant sindicatos
also had a significant effect on Indians. In their traditional way of life leadership was
granted in accordance to what is sometimes known as the cargo system-a system of
"formal and informal positions ranked according to age, service, and presti ge.u2'
Following the revolution however, positions of leadership in the sindicatos were assigned
according to political competence (or at least ambition). For this reason a more youthful
generation came to hold such leadership positions within their communities as the
dirigente, the leader of the local sindicato. As a result the MNR continued to enjoy
widespread support from the rural masses both because of the creation of universal
" Kohl,'?easant and Revolution," 259.
'8 Kohl, "The Cliza and Urcurena War," 608.le Argaflar6s, "Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 44.
20 Kohl,'?easant and Revolution," 239.
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suffrage and because of the creation of a "rural bureaucracy of dirigentes loyal to the
MNR leadership."22
The revolution suffered from its political ambiguities, or as Argaflar6s puts it, "the
new order teetered between two opposing visions of the future (one bourgeois, the other
proletarian), neither of which was compelling enough to achieve a lasting fusion between
their respective underlying social forces."23 One of the reasons that accounts for this
stalemate is that the Bolivian revolution did not have an influential writer like Victor
Raril Haya de la Torre to inspire a coherent revolutionary spirit. As Charles Arnade
points out, "Bolivia's revolution was more practical and realistic."2a The necessity of
social and economic change was sufficiently self-evident that convincing political
arguments were not necessary.
Bergsten presents the logical argument that "the progress made in political
socialization by the development of open social mobility [was] retarded, to a large
degree, by the failures...in the economic field of economic development."25 The
decreasing productivity in the agricultural sector as well as a similar trend in the mining
sector led the already under-developed Bolivia to have probably the worst performing
economy in Latin America in the 1950s.26 This decrease in agricultural production as a
result of the revolution was a cause of much concern for the MNR government.
Increasing rural stability is probably one of the primary reasons for the formalization of
"rbid.
23 Argaf,ar6s, 'Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 48.
2a Charles Arnade, "Bolivia's Social Revolution, 1952-1959: A discussion ofSources," Journal of
Inter-American Studies l, no 3 (1959):342.
25 Fred Bergsten, "social Mobitity and Economic Developme nt,,, 371.
'6Ibid.
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land reform. With this in mind the Agrarian Reform Degree of August 2,1953 should be
seen as an attempt to "legislate order into the expropriative process."27
Kohl indicates that additional economic concerns included "studying the needs of
agricultural workers, improving rural health and hygiene, promoting colonization, and
developing credit in agricultural cooperatives." These tasks were to be overseen and
accomplished by the Ministry of Indian and Peasant Affairs, which actually predated the
revolution (and contri6uted to peasant mobilization during the same), Overall the position
of the MNR "reflected the national leadership's position middle-class attitudes and
values-fear of violence, emphasis on stability and moderation, respect for private
property (except of course large estates)."28 The matter of agrarian reform had long been
a point of contention in Bolivia-as it was in most Latin American societies-and
accordingly it was one of paramount importance to the revolutionary government.
popular pressures for agrarian reform surfaced as soon as April 16, 1952-iust a week
after the beginning of the revolution. Unfortunately, however, as Kohl points out, the
'.new government was sadly lacking in trained personnel to administer the reform."2e
ArgaflarSs states that the "three largest Bolivian mining companies...were direct
trusts of U.S., British, and Swiss capital which controlled the production, elaboration, and
distribution of tin and other minerals."3o LJltimately, the "Tin Barons" were unseated and
the tin mines were nationalized. This undermined the traditional socioeconomic
foundations of Bolivian society. Scholars such as Arnade argue that the U.S. approved or
was at least indifferent to the nationaltzation of the mines because "the interests that
2' Kohl,'?easant and Revolution," 259.
28 tbid,z+8.
2e rbid.,245.
30 Argaflards, "Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 45
9
suffered from the effects of the Bolivian revolution were practically all non-American.3l
Yet, in a specialized study of American economic policy towards the MNR government
Stephen Zunes finds that, in fact, the United States had significant economic interest in
the manner in the nationalization of the mines.32 This concern is reflected in a quote from
a letter from the U.S. counselor Edward Rowell to the U.S. state department declaring of
the situation in Bolivia that "such a revolution cannot be accomplished without injuring,
perhaps fatally, those economic and political sectors which previously controlled the
destinies of the country."33 This communication contains an underlying concern
regarding radical changes in a govemment in the western hemisphere, especially when
that transition resembles the first steps toward communism. The U.S. observed, however,
that direct intervention was not necessary to prevent the direct expropriation of the mines.
Economic pressures proved to be more effective tools. Immediately following the
revolution the U.S. provided humanitarian aid to Bolivia to offset the rampant food
shortages as well as economic assistance to help curb inflation. Bolivia at this point was
desperate to secure long-term contracts for the sale of its tin, but the U.S. refused to
commit so long as the fate of the mines was in question. The implied threat, of course,
was that if the MNR did not adopt a solution favorable to the interests of the United
States that the essential aid would be withdrawn. This process described by Zunes in his
article, "The United States and Bolivia: The Taming of a Revolution, 1952-1957"
explains why the MNR ultimately chose to all but exhaust Bolivia's capital assets
31 Arnade, "Bolivia's Social Revolution," 342.
32 Stephen Zunes, "The United States and Bolivia: The Taming of a Revolution, 1952-1957,"
lntin American Perspectives 28, tro.5 (2001): 33.
" U.S. National Archives; General Records of the Department of State, Cenffal Decimal File
724.NtL-1354 quoted in Zunes, 'The United States and Bolivia," 33.
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compensating foreign investors for the expropriation of the mines instead of facing
potential economic sanctions at the hands of their international trading partners.3a
In conclusion, it is clear that Bolivian peasants wielded substantial political power
as a result of their large numbers under a policy of universal suffrage. The MNR
legitimated itself through the pursuit of policies, especially policies such as land reform
that appealed to this sizable component of the population. Immediately preceding the
revolution Bolivia had entered into a period of unprecedented political instability. In the
years betw een 1925 and 1952 no Bolivian president completed a term in office.3s In this
sense the revolution was a success since Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro, elected but denied the
presidency in 1951, served out his term as president and was peacefully replaced in 1956
through a legitimate electoral process. In other words, the Bolivian Revolution of 1952
managed to set two very important precedents for the country: the granting of full
political rights to the entire society and the peaceful function of the democratic process.
Bergsten, writing in L964, noted that "in the twelve years which have followed [the
Bolivian revolutionl, the Andean republic has made remarkable progress in breaking
down centuries-old societal gaps and forging and integrated nation."36 Bolivia was also
the first South American country to begin a gradual process of mutual acculturation with
its Indian population-that is, not merely converting Indians to European traditions an
lifestyles, but a genuine blending of Spanish and Indian traits.37 Argaflar6s, considers the
Bolivian Revolution of 1952 to be significant not because of any of its immediate effects,
but because it represents "the first moment of a bourgeoisie civil society in the
3a See: Zunes, "The United States and Bolivia."
3s Arnade, "Bolivia's Social Revolution," 341.
36 Bergsten, "social Mobility and Economic Development," 367.
37 Bergsten, "social Mobility and Economic Development," 370.
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making."38 On the other hand, however, the Bolivian revolution created a multitude of
problems such as run-away rates of inflation, food shortages, relative poverty for fixed
income groups and the remnants of the old aristocracy, as well as the collapse of the
profitable mining industry.3e To these problems must also be added the wholesale
destruction of the Bolivian upper class and a massive reduction of accumulated wealth
(both private and state wealth;.4o Even so, Bolivia is not unique among South American
nations to experience chronic economic hardships. With this in mind, it is the contention
of this author that the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 represented a substantial step forward
for Bolivians because it represents the beginning of the integration of indigenous and
colonial cultures as well as the birth of civil society in Bolivia.
38 fugaflar6s, "Bolivia's Transofrmist Revolution," 67.
3e Arnade, "Bolivia's Social Revolution," 342.
@ Fred Bergsten, "social Mobility and Economic Development," 369.
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